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Don't miss the forest for the trees-this adage is often handed down to ILs
approaching their first round of exams. The point is to get students to focus their
sights on the broader trends in the law and not the idiosyncrasies of each individual
case. In the summer of 2012, the Supreme Court overturned the life without parole
sentences being served by Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson for homicide.' The
Court held that these sentences violated the Eighth Amendment because they were
mandated upon conviction of homicide, which prevented the judge from taking
into account any mitigating circumstances that may have lessened the culpability
of these two juvenile offenders.2 Standing alone, the new rule announced in Miller
v. Alabama is a tree; it merely requires a judge to give a juvenile's case
individualized consideration before imposing a sentence of life without parole.3
But, such a narrow interpretation of Miller misses the forest of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Since June 2012, state courts have been embroiled in a debate over whether
Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively to cases that have already reached their
final disposition. Though binding only on the federal courts, 4 the Teague standard
has been the weapon of choice for all eleven state supreme courts that have
addressed the issue of whether Miller applies retroactively. 5  The Teague
retroactivity doctrine establishes a general rule of nonretroactivity for new rules
with two limited exceptions for substantive rules and "watershed" rules of criminal
* Graduate Fellow, Public Interest Law Center, Florida State University College of Law.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
2 Id at 2460.
' Id. at 2469.
4 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280-81 (2008).
5 See People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 721-23 (111. 2014); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107,
116-17 (Iowa 2013); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 834-35, 839-41 (La. 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist.
Att'y, I N.E.3d 270, 278, 280-82 (Mass. 2013); People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 818-41 (Mich.
2014); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 323-31 (Minn. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698,
701-03 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 723-24, 729-731 (Neb. 2014); Petition of
State, No. 2013-566, 2014 WL 4253359, at *3-5 (N.H. 2014); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81
A.3d 1, 8-11 (Pa. 2013); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504 (Wyo. 2014).
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procedure. 6 The Teague standard is no stranger to criticism. 7 Miller v. Alabama
illuminates one of Teague's fundamental flaws-its inability to account for rules
that consist of both substantive and procedural components. Eight states have put
Miller through the Teague analysis and a consensus has yet to develop over
whether Miller is substantive or procedural.8
The difficulty in classifying Miller as either substantive or procedural has led
some courts to place it somewhere in between. Judge Wilson, concurring in the
Eleventh Federal Circuit's retroactivity decision, suggested that Miller is better
classified as a "quasi-substantive" rule. 9 Echoing Judge Wilson's sentiment, the
Nebraska Supreme Court did not classify Miller as either substantive or
procedural, but rather applied Miller retroactively because it is "more substantive
than procedural."' 10 Finally, in holding that Miller is not retroactive as a procedural
rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dedicated a significant portion of its opinion
in Commonwealth v. Cunningham to a discussion of Teague's limitations." Judge
Castille, in his concurrence to Cunningham, lamented the "seeming inequity" that
arises from the majority's well-reasoned application of Teague.12 Castille further
predicted that it may "require a constitutional decision as innovative as Miller itself
to divine an existing Eighth Amendment basis for holding that Miller is to be
afforded retroactive effect."'
13
Only the federal courts are required to follow the Teague standard.14 Given
the difficulty courts have encountered in reaching a consensus on the substantive
vs. procedural debate, Miller's holding can be seen as an invitation to the States to
experiment with alternatives to Teague. Criminal defense attorney Ezra Landes
has offered one such alternative to Teague's exception for "watershed" procedural
rules that promises to afford new rules greater potential for retroactive
application. 15 Under Landes' "line of cases" approach, a new procedural rule is
6 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
7 See Ezra D. Landes, A New Approach to Overcoming the Insurmountable "Watershed
Rule" Exception to Teague's Collateral Review Killer, 74 Mo. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (2009).
8 It is worth noting that, at the time of this writing, the Florida Supreme Court has heard oral
argument on the issue of Miller's retroactivity, but has not yet issued an opinion. See Falcon v. State,
No. SC13-865, 2013 WL 6978507, at *1 (Fla. June 3, 2013). However, Florida uses a different
retroactivity standard than Teague, which is the focus of this article, and so it is unlikely that this
case's disposition will have any material effect on this article. Additionally, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has held that Miller applies retroactively as a substantive rule. See Ex parte
Maxwell, No. AP-76964, 2014 WL 941675, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2014). Though not the
highest court in Texas, criminal cases rarely proceed to the Texas Supreme Court.
9 In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1369(11th Cir. 2013) (Wilson, J., concurring).
10 State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014).
11 Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 7-9 (Pa. 2013).
12 Id at 11 (Castille, J., concurring).
13 Id. at 12.
14 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280-81 (2008).
15 See Landes, supra note 7, at 16.
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applied retroactively not only if it is a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure on
its own, but also if it establishes a "watershed" rule when taken together with other
cases.' 6  In short, Landes' approach to procedural rules also focuses on the
significance of the forest, rather than limiting itself to the significance of each
individual tree.
This article seeks to establish that Miller v. Alabama, when taken together
with the other recent Supreme Court cases Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida,
and J.D.B v. North Carolina, creates a watershed rule that "kids are different" and
must be treated differently throughout the criminal trial process. Because Miller
belongs to this watershed line of cases, it merits retroactive application. Part I
explains the Teague retroactivity doctrine. Part III of this article examines the
evolution of the "kids are different" rule and how Miller v. Alabama fits within
that rule. Part IV analyzes how Teague has been applied to Miller by the eleven
state supreme courts.m7 Part V discusses the "line of cases" alternative and how it
would produce more accurate and consistent results than the current Teague
standard as applied to Miller v. Alabama. Part VI concludes the article.
II. THE TEAGUE RETROACTIVITY STANDARD
In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court adopted its current standard for
determining whether new rules of criminal procedure are to be given retroactive
effect, based primarily on Justice Harlan's concurrence in Mackey v. United
States. 18 The Supreme Court felt the need to adopt a new retroactivity standard in
light of the "more than mildly negative" response to the inconsistencies and
inequalities created by the Linkletter standard that it had previously employed to
answer questions of retroactivity.19 The Linkletter standard required the Court to
analyze three factors in determining whether to apply a new rule retroactively: (1)
16 id.
17 This article specifically focuses on state courts because, unlike the federal courts, they are
not bound to follow Teague. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 280-81. Because the article is targeted at state
courts, the discussion of how Teague has been applied to Miller thus far is mostly limited to state,
rather than federal, court opinions.
18 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989). Prior to adopting Teague, the Supreme Court
employed the Linkletter standard for determining whether new rules of criminal procedure would
receive retroactive application. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Shortly before Teague
was decided, the Supreme Court had abandoned the use of the Linkletter standard for cases pending
direct review. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987). The Supreme Court found Justice
Harlan's opinions in Mackey and Desist persuasive in deciding to distinguish between cases that had
already received a final disposition from those that were pending direct review at the time a new rule
was announced in a retroactivity analysis. Id. at 321-22. When the Supreme Court revamped its
retroactivity analysis for final cases in Teague two years later, it again referred to Justice Harlan's
opinions in Mackey and Desist for guidance. Teague, 489 U.S. at 302-04.
19 Teague, 489 U.S. at 303.
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the purpose served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and
(3) the effect of retroactive application on the administration of justice.20
The Teague standard presumes that "new rules generally should not be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.",2' The Supreme Court defines
a "new rule" as one that was "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final. 22 Two minor exceptions are carved out of
Teague's general presumption of nonretroactivity for new rules that either place
"'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe"'' 23 or require "the observance of 'those
procedures that . . . are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""' 24  The
Supreme Court's interpretation of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Mackey was that
it specifically reserved the second exception for watershed rules of criminal
procedure that "'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction."' 25 The Supreme
Court further narrowed the second exception by limiting its scope to "those new
procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished," in accordance with Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist v. United
States .26
Naturally, the Teague opinion served as a catalyst for quite a bit of litigation
over exactly which rules of criminal procedure would fall within its two
exceptions. In Bousley v. United States, the Supreme Court first acknowledged the
significance of distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules in a
Teague retroactivity analysis.27 Procedural rules are only retroactive under Teague
if their absence produces a serious risk that the innocent will be convicted.28
Substantive rules necessarily carry this risk because they recognize that a criminal
statute does not reach certain conduct;29 therefore, they are generally applied
retroactively under Teague.
30
20 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
21 Teague, 489 U.S. at 305.
22 Id. at 301 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
23 Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
24 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
25 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (emphasis
omitted).
26 Id. at 313, construed in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969).
27 Bousicy v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
28 id.
29 id.
30 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004).
216 [Vol 12:213
DEPARTING FROM TEAGUE
In Danforth v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court established that only the federal
courts are required to use Teague.3' The Danforth Court found that Teague's
general "rule of nonretroactivity was fashioned to achieve the goals of federal
habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings. 32 State
courts, however, are free to give retroactive effect to cases that are deemed
"nonretroactive" under the Teague standard.33 The Court acknowledged that it had
adopted Teague in response to the inconsistent results produced by the Linkletter
approach, but maintained that "[n]onuniformity is, in fact, an unavoidable reality in
a federalist system of government."3 4 Although the Supreme Court has renounced
Linkletter, some state courts, such as in Florida and Michigan, still incorporate it
into their own retroactivity analysis to give new rules broader retroactive effect.35
III. KIDS ARE DIFFERENT: AN EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
A. The "Death is Different" Principle as Primogenitor
State legislatures are generally entrusted with great deference to fashion
appropriate penalties for criminal behavior.36 The Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment prohibits only "extreme sentences that are 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime.",3 7 Death is different. Because the death penalty is
unique in its severity and irrevocability, the Supreme Court has placed restrictions
on its imposition, including the procedures permissible to impose it, the offenses
for which it can be imposed, and the offenders upon whom it can be imposed.
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court relied on the "death is different"
principle to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.38
The Court found that the "objective indicia of consensus" among the States had
changed regarding the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles since it issued
the exact opposite holding in Stanford v. Kentucky sixteen years earlier.3 9 The
Court could simply have adopted the predominant State practice, but instead it
went further and held that juveniles have a diminished culpability as compared to
adults, meaning that they could not be classified among the worst of the worst
31 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 277 (2008).
32 Id. at 280.
33 Id. at 280-82.
14 Id. at 280.
35 See Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 929 & n.25 (Fla. 1980); People v. Maxson, 759 N.W.2d
817, 822 (Mich. 2008).
36 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983)).
38 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
39 Id. at 574. Sixteen years prior to Roper, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles. Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
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offenders deserving of the death penalty. 40 In support of its holding, the Court
relied on scientific data establishing that children are different from adults in three
important ways: (1) "[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young," (2) "juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures [than adults]," and (3) "the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.' As to that third
point, the Supreme Court elaborated that "[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption. 42
The Roper Court found that a categorical prohibition on the death penalty for
juveniles was necessary, rather than simply requiring a sentencer to take a
defendant's youthfulness into account, because "[a]n unacceptable likelihood
exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course. 43 In fact,
the Court was concerned that "[i]n some cases, a defendant's youth may even be
counted against him." 44 So, Roper v. Simmons broke from the Supreme Court's
earlier holding in Stanford v. Kentucky as more than a mere acknowledgement that
the States had begun to change their practices regarding the juvenile death penalty.
Roper established that "kids are different" from adults in three fundamental ways
and that these differences warrant categorically different treatment by a sentencing
authority.
In 2010, the Supreme Court issued Graham v. Florida, which broke open the
"death is different" barrier by utilizing a categorical analysis to find that sentences
of life without parole are unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders
convicted of non-homicide offenses. 45  Graham relied on much of the same
scientific data that the Court used in Roper, finding that advancements in
neuroscience had reinforced earlier findings from psychology and social science by
producing evidence that "parts of the brain involved in behavior continue to mature
through late adolescence. 46 Therefore, "[j]uveniles are more capable of change
than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of 'irretrievably
depraved character.'
47
40 Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
41 Id. at 569-70.
42 Id. at 573.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61-62 (2010).
46 Id. at 68.
47 Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
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As in Roper, the Graham Court found that a categorical prohibition on life
without parole was necessary due to concerns over whether "courts taking a case-
by-case proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the
few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for
change., 48  Additionally, the Court expressed concern that the defining
characteristics of youth make juveniles more difficult to adequately represent
throughout the trial process and that a case-by-case approach would inadvertently
result in greater punishment for juveniles because of these difficulties.49
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the State must provide a "meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" to
all juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses who are serving life sentences.5 0
Due to both its unprecedented imposition of a categorical ban on a noncapital
sentencing scheme and its focus on the defining characteristics of juveniles,
Graham's holding quickly came to be understood as more than a mere extension of
the "death is different" principle. Graham's requirement that the State provide a
"meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation" can be seen as establishing a right to rehabilitation for juveniles. 5'
Graham expanded on the framework built in Roper by emphasizing that the
fundamental differences between children and adults make children more prone to
rehabilitation and have implications on the criminal trial process. While Roper
may be seen as a mere extension of the "death is different" principle, Graham
stood for a new constitutional principle that "kids are different" and must be
treated differently by the criminal justice system.52
B. The "Kids are Different" Principle Takes Root
A year after Graham, the Supreme Court decided J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
which required a judge to consider a juvenile defendant's age when evaluating
whether he or she was in custody for Miranda purposes. 53  Again, science
motivated the Court, as it expressed concern over studies illustrating the
48 Id. at 77.
41 Id. at 78-79.
'o Id. at 75.
51 See Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L.
REV. 99, 103 (2010).
52 See Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile's Right to Age-Appropriate
Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 463 (2012) (citing Arya, supra note 51, at 99); loana
Tchoukleva, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap between Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v.
Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92,94 (2013). But see William W. Berry IIl, More Different than
Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010) (arguing that Graham is an extension of
the "death is different" principle to life without parole sentences, rather than a new categorical rule
for juveniles).
53 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
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heightened risk of false confessions from youths. 54 Though departing from the
realm of sentencing, the Court relied on much of the same rationale that animated
its earlier rulings in Graham and Roper, including the three fundamental
differences between juveniles and adults.55 By the time it decided J.D.B., the
Court regarded the "kids are different" principle as a matter of common sense,
stating that "[s]uch conclusions [about juvenile behavior and perception] apply
broadly to children as a class. And, they are self-evident to anyone who was a
child once himself, including any police officer or judge. 56 In fact, the Court
went so far as to say that "in many cases involving juvenile suspects, the custody
analysis would be nonsensical absent some consideration of the suspect's age.",
57
J.D.B. is aimed squarely at improving the accuracy of a criminal trial by
ensuring that one of the State's key pieces of evidence-a confession-is not
tainted by a juvenile suspect's inherent inability to understand his or her
surroundings and exercise mature judgment.5 8 Though youthfulness will not be a
significant factor in every custody determination, to ignore it would be "to deny
children the full scope of the procedural safeguards that Miranda guarantees to
adults. 59  The Supreme Court's application of "kids are different" to pretrial
custody determinations in J.D.B. establishes that this rule extends far beyond
60
sentencing.
In 2012, the Supreme Court finally pronounced in Miller v. Alabama that "if
(as Harmelin recognized) 'death is different,' children are different too. '61 This
landmark decision dispelled any possibility that Graham's holding was a mere
deviation from the "death is different" mold. Building off the scientific evidence
that it had used in Roper and Graham, the Court made it clear that "none of what
[Graham] said about children-about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits
and environmental vulnerabilities-is crime-specific. '62  The Court not only
prohibited the states from imposing mandatory sentences of life without parole on
juveniles convicted of homicide offenses, but also cautioned that "given all we
have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children's diminished
14 Id. at 240 1.
" Id. at 2403.
56 Id.
7 Id. at 2405.
58 Id. at 2403.
9 Id. at 2408.
60 See Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States Supreme Court Adopts
a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for Purposes of the Miranda Custody
Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles be Far Behind?, 47 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 501, 517 (2012) (arguing that the "reasonable juvenile" standard employed by the Supreme
Court in JD.B. opens the door for consideration of the unique attributes of youth in other criminal
law contexts).
61 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).
62 Id. at 2465.
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culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon."63 The
Court stopped short of imposing a categorical ban as it had in Roper and Graham,
finding instead that its holding was sufficient to resolve Miller and its companion
case, Jackson v. Hobbs.64
As in Graham, the Miller Court also took issue with the inability of the
mandatory sentencing schemes to account for ways in which the distinguishing
characteristics of youth may influence the criminal trial process itself.65 The Court
stated that a sentencing court needs to consider a juvenile's "inability to deal with
police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to
assist his own attorneys. 66 So, Miller establishes not only that "kids are different"
for the purpose of sentencing, but also that their differences affect the fairness of
the criminal trial process itself.
Miller v. Alabama is the latest Supreme Court case in the "kids are different"
line. But, some state courts have embraced this emerging constitutional principle
and further expanded on it. Most prominently, the Iowa Supreme Court released
its own trilogy of juvenile sentencing cases-Null, Ragland, and Pearson--on
August 16, 2013.67 While Null and Ragland address issues related directly to the
implementation of Miller, Pearson advances the "kids are different" principle well
beyond what the Supreme Court has mandated thus far. Pearson had been
sentenced to a term of fifty years with parole eligibility after thirty-five years for a
series of armed robberies she had participated in as a juvenile. 68 Acknowledging
that Miller specifically addressed only juvenile offenders who received life without
parole sentences for homicide offenses, the Pearson court held that "its reasoning
applies equally to Pearson's sentence of thirty-five years without the possibility of
parole for these [non-homicide] offenses. 69  The court found that Pearson's
lengthy sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because "the district court
emphasized the nature of the crimes to the exclusion of the mitigating features of
youth., 70 Holding otherwise, the court feared, "would be ignoring the teaching of
63 Id. at 2469.
64 id.
65 Id. at 2468.
66 id.
67 State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72-75 (Iowa 2013) (holding that Miller protections are
triggered when a juvenile is sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years that guarantees either life in prison
or geriatric release and providing guidance on what the trial court must do to comply with Miller);
State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013) (holding that Miller requires that the trial court
consider the mitigating features of youth before imposing a lengthy sentence on a juvenile offender
convicted of certain offenses); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013) (holding that
Miller applies retroactively as a substantive rule under Teague).
68 Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 89.
69 Id. at 96.
70 Id. at 97.
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the Roper-Graham-Miller line of cases that juveniles have less culpability than
adults, that the few youths who are irredeemable are difficult to identify, and that
juveniles have rehabilitation potential exceeding that of adults., 71 Importantly, the
Iowa Supreme Court repeatedly framed its holding as guided by the "principles
underlying Miller" or "the Roper-Graham-Miller line of cases," rather than by
Miller alone.72
IV. TEAGUE AS APPLIED TO MLLER V. ALABAMA
Eleven state supreme courts have tackled the retroactivity question presented
by Miller, and all eleven have used Teague.73 The substantive vs. procedural
debate has thus far been dispositive of whether a state court applies Miller
retroactively, with six states finding that Miller is a substantive rule that applies
retroactively, four finding that it is a procedural rule that does not, and one state
finding that Miller contains both substantive and procedural aspects and applies
retroactively because it is more substantive than procedural. Indeed, the Miller
opinion itself left the states with mixed signals on whether it is substantive or
procedural.74
In Miller, the Supreme Court stated that "[o]ur decision does not categorically
bar a penalty .. . .[i]nstead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
process . . . before imposing a particular penalty. 75 On its face, this quote places
Miller squarely within the procedural category, meaning that it only applies
retroactively if it is deemed "watershed." However, Miller v. Alabama differs
significantly from other procedural rules, such as those announced in Apprendi
7 6
and Ring,77 in that Miller does not simply tweak an existing fact-finding process,
7 Id. at 96.
72 Id. at 95-98.
73 See People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114,
117 (Iowa 2013); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 834 (La. 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att'y, 1 N.E.3d
270, 278 (Mass. 2013); People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 818-41; Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d
311, 324 (Minn. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842
N.W.2d 716, 724 (Neb. 2014); Petition of State, No. 2013-566, 2014 WL 4253359, at *4-5 (N.H.
2014); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 8 (Pa. 2013); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 507-
08 (Wyo. 2014).
74 It appears that the United States Supreme Court will not be providing the States with any
more guidance as to Miller's retroactivity within the next term, since it denied certiorari petitions in
two of the state supreme court cases. See Tate v. Louisiana, 134 S. Ct. 2663, 2663 (2014);
Cunningham v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 2724, 2724 (2014).
75 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
76 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact, other than the
fact of a prior conviction, "that increases the penalty for [a] crime above the statutory maximum must
be submitted to the jury, and prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt").
77 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that aggravating factors, necessary to
impose the death penalty, must be found by a jury rather than a judge).
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but rather requires the creation of a fact-finding process where none existed before.
Further, given the Supreme Court's admonition that life without parole should be
reserved for that "rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption, ' 7 8 it is undeniable that Miller v. Alabama will function as an outright
prohibition on life without parole for the vast majority of juvenile offenders.
Finally, some courts have noted that it simply seems unfair to deny application of
Miller's holding to certain children based solely on the timing of their offense.
79
This article proceeds to analyze each of the state supreme court opinions
regarding the retroactive application of Miller in three parts: (1) those States that
have found Miller to be a substantive rule, (2) those that have found Miller to be
procedural, and (3) Nebraska, which put Miller somewhere in between.
A. Miller is a Substantive Rule
Mississippi was the first state to give Miller v. Alabama retroactive effect in
Jones v. State. Using a Teague analysis, the Jones Court held that Miller is a
substantive rule of criminal procedure .8  For Mississippi, the inquiry was simple:
Miller is a substantive rule because it narrowed the scope of the existing
punishment statute in Mississippi in that the existing "sentencing scheme may be
applied to juveniles only after applicable Miller characteristics and circumstances
have been considered by the sentencing authority. As such, Miller modified
[Mississippi's] substantive law by narrowing its application for juveniles." 82 Iowa
followed in State v. Ragland, predicating its holding on a broader set of rationales
than Mississippi did.8 3 Though it found that the practical effect of Miller was the
creation of a new sentencing procedure, the Ragland Court also found that at the
root of this process was a substantive ban on a certain form of punishment for a
certain class of offenders.84 Illinois repeated this characterization of Miller in
People v. Davis, holding that it applies retroactively. 85 Similarly, Iowa's analysis
guided New Hampshire and Wyoming in their respective decisions holding that
Miller applies retroactively.8 6  Iowa also emphasized that the two strands of
precedent that Miller is based on-the categorical bans on specific penalties for
78 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
79 See Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. 2013) (Castille, C.J., concurring);
Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
80 122 So. 3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 702.
83 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013).
84 Id. at 115-16.
15 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (111. 2014).
86 Petition of State, No. 2013-566, 2014 WL 4253359, at *4-5 (N.H. 2014); State v. Mares,
335 P.3d 487, 507-08 (Wyo. 2014).
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certain offenders and the cases requiring individualized sentencing before
imposition of the death penalty-had all been applied retroactively. 87
Massachusetts also found that Miller applies retroactively in Diatchenko v. District
Attorney, but, unlike in the other States, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
remedied Miller by enacting a categorical ban on sentencing juveniles to life
without parole.88
With the exception of Massachusetts,89 the States that found Miller to be a
substantive rule regarded mandatory life without parole sentences as more severe
penalties than discretionary life without parole sentences. So, by requiring the
States to implement a certain procedure, the Supreme Court did invoke a
substantive ban on a distinct penalty on juveniles-mandatory life without
parole. 90 Therefore, the fact that Mississippi, Iowa, and Illinois had to expand the
range of possible penalties for juveniles convicted of homicide was sufficient to
render Miller a substantive change in the law, even though no categorical ban on
life without parole was imposed.9 1
B. Miller is a Procedural Rule Lacking Significance to Merit Retroactive
Application
In Chambers v. State, Minnesota became the first state to reject retroactive
application of Miller under the Teague standard. 92 The Minnesota Court classified
Miller as a procedural rule because it did not announce a new element that must be
proven before the State can impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile;
rather, it simply "altered the permissible methods by which the State can exercise
its continuing power to punish juvenile homicide offenders by life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole., 93 Before considering whether Miller v. Alabama
is a "watershed rule of criminal procedure," the Court stressed just how narrow this
class of rules is, emphasizing that the "'rule must both be "necessary to prevent an
impermissibly large risk of inaccurate conviction" [and must] "alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the
proceeding."'' 94 Minnesota then concluded that Miller is not a "watershed rule"
because it affects only the juvenile's sentence and not the underlying conviction,
87 Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 116.
18 1 N.E.3d 270, 286-87 (Mass. 2013).
89 As noted, Miller actually did operate as a categorical ban on juvenile life without parole in
Massachusetts. Id.
9' Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722-23; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-16.
9' Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722-23; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115; Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698,
702 (Miss. 2013).
92 831 N.W.2d 311, 328 (Minn. 2013).
9' Id. at 328-30.
94 Id. at 330 (citing Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 498 (Minn. 2012)).
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and because there are numerous other cases establishing a right to present
mitigating evidence at sentencing. 95  Pennsylvania and Louisiana essentially
reiterated Minnesota's retroactivity analysis in holding that Miller is not
retroactive.
96
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, the Pennsylvania case finding that Miller
does not apply retroactively, does contain one interesting distinction in that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis by criticizing the Teague standard,
noting that it "is not necessarily a natural model for retroactivity jurisprudence as
applied at the state level."97 However, since neither party proposed an alternative
to Teague, the Cunningham Court felt bound to follow it.98 Likewise, in People v.
Carp, the Michigan Supreme Court applied both the Teague retroactivity standard
and its own state standard, which incorporates the Linkletter factors. 99 After
concluding that Miller is a procedural rule that does not merit retroactive
application under Teague, Michigan found that Miller fares no better with the
Linkletter factors because it affects the juvenile's sentence rather than the
underlying conviction. 100 The Michigan Court's understanding of Linkletter was
that only rules implicating the determination of guilt or innocence favor retroactive
application under Linkletter's first and most important factor-the purpose of the
rule.1l The Michigan Court further stated that the latter two Linkletter factors-
the extent of reliance on the old rule and the effect on the administration of
justice-also weighed against retroactive application. 102
The States that found Miller to be a procedural rule did not consider a
mandatory sentence of life without parole to be any more severe than a
discretionary sentence of life without parole. So, in their view, Miller simply
required States to change the means in which they imposed the exact same penalty
that they had already been imposing. 0 3 Further, these States all agreed that Miller
would need to clear two hurdles in order to be considered a "watershed" rule of
criminal procedure. 104 The first of these hurdles was the effect that Miller would
have on the underlying conviction. 0 5 The second was whether Miller alters the
95 Id.
96 See State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 839-41 (La. 2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81
A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013).
7 81 A.3dat 8.
98 Id. at 8-9.
99 852 N.W.2d 801, 818-41 (Mich. 2014).
"' Id. at 832-41.
'0' Id. at 833-35.
102 Id. at 837.
103 State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 837-38 (La. 2013); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311,
328-30 (Minn. 2013); Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10.
"0 Tate, 130 So. 3d at 839-40; Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 330; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10.
105 Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 330.
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understanding of "bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the
proceeding." ' 0 6 No State found that Miller met these two requirements, and so it
has not yet been applied retroactively as a procedural rule.
C. The Mantich Opinion: Miller is Somewhere in between Substantive and
Procedural
Most recently, in State v. Mantich, the Nebraska Supreme Court applied
Miller retroactively. 107 Nebraska surveyed the responses of other state and federal
courts and found that Miller embodied both procedural and substantive
components. 108 As did the other "substantive" states, the Mantich Court took into
account the effect that Miller had on Nebraska's substantive law and the United
States Supreme Court's application of Miller's holding to Jackson v. Hobbs and
concluded that Miller applies retroactively.' 09 But, ultimately, "it is the absence of
• . . choice that makes the Miller rule more substantive than procedural." '" 0
Although Nebraska agreed "that the Miller rule is entirely substantive when
viewed as Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Illinois have," it did not go so far as to
declare that Miller is in fact a substantive rule, only that it is "more substantive
than procedural.""'
Nebraska's analysis is likely the most honest of any that have been
undertaken thus far. The "substantive" States have all had to reconcile their
holdings with the fact that Miller plainly states that "it mandates only that a
sentencer follow a certain process ...before imposing a particular penalty.""1
2
Likewise, the "procedural" States have had to diminish the relevance of Jackson v.
Hobbs and both strands of cases leading up to Miller,113 while also ignoring the
fact that they do have to come up with some new penalties as an alternative for
juveniles convicted of homicide, but not sentenced to life without parole.
Nebraska avoided this situation by acknowledging that Miller possesses both
substantive and procedural aspects and placing Miller on the substantive side of the
continuum. 114
106 Id.
107 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014).
10' Id at 726-30.
109 Id. at 730-31.
"o Id. at 731.
I" Id.
112 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
"13 Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. 2013).
114 Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 729-31.
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: TEAGUE AS APPLIED TO THE "KIDS ARE
DIFFERENT" LINE OF CASES
Eight states have addressed the issue of whether Miller v. Alabama applies
retroactively and a consensus has yet to emerge. As the Nebraska Supreme Court
discussed, this is likely because Miller is neither purely substantive nor purely
procedural." 5 A rule this evasive of classification may simply be the product of
the Supreme Court's minimalist inclinations. 116 In Miller, the Supreme Court
stopped short of imposing a categorical ban on life without parole for all juveniles,
because the "holding [was] sufficient to decide [Miller and Jackson]."117 But, as
Professor Berkheiser has noted, when predictability is important, "the narrowness
of minimalism 'can be a big mistake.""'18 Professor Berkheiser expressed concern
over the predictability of what length of sentences juveniles affected by Miller
might receive," 9 but Miller has yielded unpredictable results with the even more
rudimentary issue of which juveniles it actually applies to. Ezra Landes also spoke
of judicial minimalism as necessitating the "line of cases" modification to Teague,
since "[t]his Court's commitment to narrowness means that we are unlikely to ever
see a revolutionary Warren Court style holding like a Gideon (or a Mapp or a
Miranda), which in turn augurs ill for the watershed rule exception ever being
satisfied under the current regime."' 120 Teague reserves retroactive application for
"watershed rules of criminal procedure," but States implementing a minimalist
Supreme Court's holdings need a standard by which incremental, yet important,
changes in the law can receive retroactive effect. The "line of cases" approach is a
simple modification to the existing Teague standard, which promises more
accurate and fair retroactive application of the incremental procedural rules that are
consistent with the current Supreme Court's judicial philosophy.
A state court applying a modified Teague standard to Miller v. Alabama
would begin in the same way that courts applying Teague currently do. The first
inquiry would be whether or not Miller announces a new rule. 121 Finding that
Miller does announce a new rule, the court would then ask whether Miller is a
substantive or a procedural rule. Some courts, especially those in states like
Massachusetts that have abolished life without parole for juveniles as a response to
115 See id. at 729.
116 Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led
the Court's "Kids are Different" Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Down a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON
L. REV. 489,514-15 (2013).
117 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
118 Berkheiser, supra note 116, at 517 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1909-10 (2006)).
119 Id.
120 Landes, supra note 7, at 18.
121 As the Nebraska Supreme Court noted "[i]t is very clear that Miller announced a new rule."
State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Neb. 2014).
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Miller, may conclude that Miller is substantive. However, others will not, and will
move on to the next stage of the inquiry, which is whether Miller is a "watershed"
rule of criminal procedure. Most state courts will likely follow the example set by
the other procedural states and declare that Miller is not a "watershed rule," which
ends the inquiry under Teague.122 But, using a modified Teague standard, a state
court would then ask whether Miller belongs to a "line of cases." Given the depth
at which the Supreme Court discussed Roper and Graham in the Miller opinion,
state courts will likely conclude that Miller does belong to the "kids are different"
line of cases. 123 So, the question becomes whether the "kids are different" line of
cases is a "watershed rule." As the Minnesota Court discussed in Chambers, in
order for "kids are different" to reach watershed status it must (1) be necessary to
prevent an impermissibly large risk of inaccurate conviction, and (2) alter the
understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the
proceeding. 124
A. The Effect of the "Kids are Different" Principle on the Accuracy of a
Conviction
The procedural States have held that Miller does not prevent an impermissibly
large risk of inaccurate conviction because it merely affects sentencing and not the
underlying conviction. 125 "Kids are different," on the other hand, includes JD.B.
v. North Carolina, which improves the accuracy of the criminal trial process by
requiring a judge to determine whether one of the State's most powerful pieces of
evidence in any case-a confession-is too unreliable to be admissible due to the
defendant's youthfulness. 126  J.D.B. and other cases concerning the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination directly implicate the accuracy of the
criminal trial because "the pressure of custodial interrogation is so immense that it
'can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they
never committed.' 127 The risk of a false confession is further heightened with
juveniles because they are even more prone to succumb to these pressures. 128
The holdings of Graham and Miller specifically alter juvenile sentencing
practices; in doing so, they address the ways in which juveniles are disadvantaged
all throughout the criminal trial process.129 In Graham, the Supreme Court listed
122 See State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829 (La. 2013); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.
2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013).
123 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
124 Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 330.
125 Id.; People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 834-35 (Mich. 2014).
126 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011).
127 Id. at 2401 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009)).
128 Id




the fact that "the features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a
significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings" as a justification for imposing a
categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-
homicide offenses. 130  The Graham Court went on to say that "[d]ifficulty in
weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance
to trust defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects,
all can lead to poor decisions by one charged with a juvenile offense."' 31 In
Miller, the Supreme Court similarly pointed out that a sentencing scheme that
mandates life without parole for juveniles convicted of certain offenses "ignores
that [the defendant] might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if
not for the incompetencies associated with youth-for example, his inability to
deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his
incapacity to assist his own attorneys."'' 32 So, while Graham and Miller may only
require a state to change its sentencing practices as applied to juveniles, they do so,
in part, as a safeguard against disproportionate punishment for juveniles whose
immaturity caused them to be convicted of a more serious offense than an adult
would have been. Therefore, a state court could easily conclude that the "kids are
different" principle is necessary to prevent inaccurate convictions.
B. Whether the "Kids are Different" Principle Alters the Understanding of
Bedrock Procedural Elements Essential to the Fairness of the Proceeding.
The procedural states have rejected the claim that Miller alters the
understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of
sentencing because there are numerous other cases establishing the importance of
the ability to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. 133 But, a state employing a
modified Teague standard would take a step back and ask whether the "kids are
different" principle as a whole marks a shift in the law that alters the understanding
of procedural fairness.
Gideon v. Wainwright is the only "watershed" rule of criminal procedure
currently in existence under the Teague standard. 1 34 In issuing Gideon, the Court
explicitly overturned Betts v. Brady decided only twenty years earlier, which held
that the right to counsel was not a "fundamental right" to be incorporated on the
States. 1 35 The Gideon Court stated that "Betts was 'an anachronism when handed
down' and ... should now be overruled."'' 36 Similarly, when the Supreme Court
130 Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
131 Id
132 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
133 State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 840-41 (La. 2013); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 330
(Minn. 2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013).
134 See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417-18 (2004).
135 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
136 Id.
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issued Roper v. Simmons, it explicitly overturned its ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky
from only sixteen years earlier. 137 As Gideon broke from recent precedent, so too
did Roper break from the existing precedent that altered the understanding of
fairness regarding juveniles in the criminal justice system.
Additionally, the "kids are different" principle also refutes the legislative
dogma from the past several decades of "adult time for adult crime., 138  As
Professor Guggenheim put it, "[l]egislatures, policy-makers, and courts ceased
regarding children as mostly different from adults, and instead, for the first time
since juvenile court came into being, began regarding children . . . as largely
similar to adults."'139  While Miller may simply extend the existing right to
individualized sentencing that adults facing the death penalty already possess to
juveniles confronting life without parole, it is part of a much broader shift in the
law that reverses the trends that have characterized the criminal trial process as it
applied to juveniles for decades. Therefore, a state court looking at the "kids are
different" principle would likely find that it alters the understanding of procedural
fairness, in that it requires states to do something they have refused to do for
decades-treat children, even those accused of serious crimes, like children.
VI. CONCLUSION
Eleven states have attempted to solve the Miller retroactivity puzzle using
Teague and a consensus has yet to emerge. 40 The split among states assessing
Miller's retroactivity is exactly the kind of inconsistency that the Supreme Court
sought to remedy by adopting Teague. 141 Although Danforth embraced federalism
and nonuniformity among the States using their own standards for retroactivity, 42
the failure of the States to produce consistent results with the same standard points
to a fundamental flaw with Teague-its inability to deal with rules that are "quasi-
substantive." States are under no obligation to use Teague, 143 and, as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in Cunningham, the Teague standard "is not
necessarily a natural model for retroactivity jurisprudence as applied at the state
137 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
138 See Guggenheim, supra note 52, at 473.
139 id.
140 See People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (111. 2014); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114,
117 (Iowa 2013); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 834 (La. 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att'y, I N.E.3d
270, 278 (Mass. 2013); People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 818-41; Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d
311, 324 (Minn. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842
N.W.2d 716, 724 (Neb. 2014); Petition of State, No. 2013-566, 2014 WL 4253359, at *4-5 (N.H.
2014); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 8 (Pa. 2013); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504
(Wyo. 2014).
141 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302-03 (1989).
142 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008).
143 id. at 280-81.
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level." 144  So, Miller v. Alabama invites the States to experiment with some
alternatives to Teague.
The modified Teague approach discussed in this article simply adds another
two steps to the Teague analysis for procedural rules. After a state court has
concluded that a procedural rule is not "watershed" on its own, the court would
then ask whether the rule belongs to a cognizable line of cases and, if so, whether
that line of cases establishes a watershed rule of criminal procedure. For Miller,
the line of cases would be "kids are different."'' 45 A state court analyzing "kids are
different" would find that it is a watershed rule for two reasons. First, "kids are
different" does a lot to guarantee that the conviction of a juvenile is accurate by
taking into account how the factors of youth may implicate the trial process.
Second, the "kids are different" rule breaks from the pre-existing jurisprudence and
legislative sentiment regarding juveniles convicted of serious crimes and alters the
understanding of procedural fairness with regard to juvenile offenders.
There are certainly flaws with a modified Teague approach. Some may argue
that adding two steps to Teague will add even more complexity to an already
convoluted analysis. But, any additional exception to Teague's general rule of
nonretroactivity aimed at "quasi-substantive" rules will carry the same degree of
complexity. Others may argue that it is best to build on the Nebraska Supreme
Court's analysis of Miller in Mantich and view the substantive vs. procedural
question as one of degree, rather than category. 46 But it can be just as subjective,
if not more so, for courts to decide how "substantive" rules have to be before they
apply retroactively as it is to decide whether rules are substantive or not. Finally,
some may argue that the better approach is to follow the lead of states like Florida
and Michigan, which incorporate the Linkletter factors into their own retroactivity
analyses to give broader retroactive effect. 147 However, it seems contradictory to
revert back to a standard that the Supreme Court has already declared to be unfair
and inconsistent when trying to craft a fairer and more consistent retroactivity
standard. 48 So, the "line of cases" Teague modification is an attractive option
when compared to the alternatives in that it allows for retroactive application of
important, yet incremental, changes in the law without doing much to disrupt the
existing retroactivity jurisprudence.
As the Iowa Supreme Court stated in Ragland, at the root of this process
mandated by Miller is a substantive ban on a certain form of punishment for a
certain class of offenders. 149 Iowa's interpretation sensed the forest behind the
144 Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 8.
141 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
146 See State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 732-33 (Neb. 2014) (Cassel, J., dissenting).
147 See, Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 929 & n.25 (Fla. 1980); People v. Maxson, 759 N.W.2d
817, 822 (Mich. 2008).
148 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302-03 (1989).
"49 State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115-16. (Iowa 2013).
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tree, which prompted that Court to apply Miller retroactively.150 If other courts
were to step back and look at the whole forest using a modified Teague standard,
they too would be able to see Miller v. Alabama for what it is-a procedural rule
that is part of a substantive shift in the law regarding how juveniles are treated in
the criminal justice system, which deserves retroactive application.
15 Id. at 117.
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